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“YOU CAN’T GET THERE FROM HERE?”:
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS IN
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER AEDPA
GREGORY J. O‘MEARA, S.J.*
One measure of a society is how it treats those with little power, those
who have suffered from problems not of their own choosing. 1 Surely victims
of crime fit into this category, and society has not often given them what they
desire and need. 2 Though they garner far less sympathy, perpetrators of crime
may also be vulnerable to forces beyond their control, including physical and
mental disabilities, childhoods marked by abuse and neglect, and incompetent
attorneys who fail to fulfill constitutionally mandated standards. 3 The
criminal justice system attempts to address deficiencies in the representation
criminal defendants receive in part through its appellate process. Following
the exhaustion of state court postconviction review, prisoners in state custody
can petition for relief in federal courts by applying for a writ of habeas
corpus.4 Congress attempted to restrict access to federal courts for habeas
relief with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. The author would like to thank
Professors Daniel Blinka, Scott Moss, Peter Rofes, Paul Secunda, and the members of the Marquette
University Law School Works in Progress Colloquium for their extraordinarily helpful comments.
He also thanks participants at Marquette University Law School‘s Criminal Appeals: Past, Present,
and Future Conference for their helpful suggestions. I owe a further debt of gratitude to three
different students who helped with the research on this Article: Mr. Jonathan Thiry, Mr. Bryan
Bayer, and Mr. Michael Moeschberger. Finally, thank you to the kind staff at the Marquette
University Law Library, especially Ms. Julia Jaet, who graciously helped me hunt down sources.
1. See, e.g., ENRIQUE DUSSEL, PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION 60 (Aquilina Martinez & Christine
Morkovsky trans., Orbis Books 1990).
2. See, e.g., CHARLES DOYLE, CRIME VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS ACT 3 (2008).
3. This position that the system can serve the rights of both victims and criminals is not
uncontroversial. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 137 (2004). ―[A] senior U.S. Justice Department official . . . once told
us, ‗People are either for victims or for criminals, . . . you‘re for criminals.‘ That forced choice is
nonsense, but it was widely held to be necessary in the 1980s and early 1990s.‖ Id. Most studies
associate crime with poverty, and studies which draw different conclusions seem to suffer from
methodological flaws. For a broad exploration of crime statistics and their difficulties, see generally
ROBERT REINER, LAW AND ORDER: AN HONEST CITIZEN ‘S GUIDE TO CRIME AND CONTROL 44–116
(2007).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) provides that ―application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .‖ Id.
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(AEDPA). 5 This Article explores how representative federal courts have
responded to that legislation.
AEDPA‘s limitations on habeas relief for state prisoners6 have been quite
successful in some ways;7 nevertheless, petitioners claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel have met with more success in circuit and district courts
than anticipated. Despite AEDPA, courts have expanded Strickland v.
Washington‘s holding beyond an honest reading of the original case. 8 This
expansion, I argue, is not unrelated to AEDPA itself. First, AEDPA ignores
that the writ of habeas corpus is rooted not only in statute but also in the text
of the Constitution itself. Second, AEDPA‘s drafters assumed that case
precedent binds lower courts as statutory law does; therefore, they believed
AEDPA would confer greater authority upon Supreme Court precedent than
these cases already possess. It does not. These problems with the original
legislation have led federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to expand
the class of successful petitioners who claim ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Habeas review for state prisoners is currently seen as an exercise in
futility.9 This conclusion emerges out of appellate counsel‘s wrestling with
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–108,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996).
6. ―Section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA tightly circumscribes grants of habeas relief to a limited set
of state court decisions . . . .‖ Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “Clearly Established
Law” in Habeas Review: Carey v. Musladin, 121 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335 (2007) [hereinafter
Clearly Established Law]. For a general analysis of AEDPA, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the
New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
7. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 279 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(―In AEDPA, Congress work[ed] substantial changes to the power of federal courts to grant habeas
corpus relief.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). But see Larry W. Yackle,
State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
541, 547 (2006).
[With the passage of AEDPA,] the Court might have used the occasion
provided by new legislation to shape things into a more sensible form—
integrating new statutory provisions into existing decisional law, identifying and
reconciling discernible rationales, and blending everything together into a more
coherent system. That has not happened. . . . AEDPA is replete with tensions
that defy resolution through pragmatic judicial construction.
Id.
8. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting out affirmative standards for
determining if counsel‘s representation is effective within the requirements of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel for criminal defendants).
9. As Professor Stephen Vladeck observes:
More than a dozen times in the past five Terms, the Supreme Court has
reversed an appellate court‘s decision granting postconviction habeas relief to a
state prisoner: not because it concluded that the state court had acted correctly,
but because the state court‘s error was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
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the roadblocks AEDPA erected to limit federal review. 10 Even before the
passage of AEDPA, the Supreme Court severely limited petitioners‘ access to
federal courts.11 Anecdotally, appellate attorneys have mentioned that,
because petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus is a losing proposition, their
time is better spent elsewhere.
This Article challenges the belief that defendants cannot prevail in habeas
actions; although few prisoners successfully petition for the writ, recent
federal circuit court cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel indicate
there may be more life in this body of law than is commonly thought. 12 After
briefly describing the procedural posture in which the writ of habeas corpus
for state prisoners arises, the Article shows how AEDPA‘s requirement of
deferential review restricts habeas access. The Article then considers two
mistaken assumptions that underlie AEDPA‘s analytical framework: first, the
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court, which is the standard of review prescribed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 595 (2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120
(2008) (per curiam); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465
(2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006); Kane v. Garcia
Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2005) (per curiam); Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005); Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447 (2005) (per curiam); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S.
649 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); Middlet on v. McNeil, 541
U.S. 433 (2004) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (per curiam); Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) (per curiam)).
10. The specific limitations on access have been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006), which
provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State
court proceeding.
Id. In this Article, when I refer to AEDPA, I am usually referring to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
11. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259,
262 (2006); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1,
4–5 (1997); Yackle, supra note 7, at 544, 547.
12. Even though few petitioners are successful in applying for the writ, the impact of habeas
cases on criminal procedure cannot be overstated. Most of the major Supreme Court precedent
expanding or contracting what we now know as the constitutional aspects of the criminal justice
system arose in habeas cases. Even though these cases seem statistically insignificant, they acquire a
symbolic value as they act as a lodestar, guiding courts and counsel about what constitutes
constitutionally significant arguments before the courts.
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writ of habeas corpus rests not only on statutory but also on constitutional
grounds, which limits how far AEDPA‘s restrictions can go, and second,
AEDPA ignores that case precedent binds differently from statutory law.
With the foregoing as prologue, I turn to the substantive case law of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the Strickland line of cases. After briefly
predicting how post-AEDPA cases should be decided based on a fair read of
Strickland, the Article examines more recent decisions of the circuit courts.
Representative cases reveal that courts have insisted that defense attorneys do
far more than Strickland required to be found effective. In so ruling, federal
courts uphold their rightful place as interpreters of the Constitution and as
protectors of defendants‘ rights.
As a final preliminary matter, petitioners subject to the death penalty
constitute most of the successful applicants for the writ in the cases that
follow.13 Because habeas petitioners are not granted counsel as a matter of
constitutional right, they must represent themselves, pay for counsel, or rely
on attorneys who act pro bono or are appointed by the district court. 14 Thus,
paradoxically, those facing the death penalty may be in a better position to
have their rights vindicated in federal court than those not subject to capital
punishment. Presumably, a number of state prisoners sentenced to life or less
time in prison have also suffered constitutionally infirm representation.
However, these petitioners‘ meritorious claims may go unheard because their

13. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH ROW LAWYER SPEAKS OUT
AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 137–38 (1997).
[T]he success rate of noncapital habeas petitions is low, with estimates ranging
from 0.25 percent to 3.2 percent to 7 percent. The success rate in capital habeas
is much higher, however: 70 percent as of 1983, 60 percent as of 1986, and 40
percent as of today. Between 1976 and 1983 federal appellate courts ruled in
favor of the condemned inmate in 73.2 percent of the capital habeas appeals
heard, compared with only 6.5 percent of the decisions in noncapital habeas
cases.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 558, 572 (5th Cir. 2009)
(affirming the district court‘s granting of the writ in a non-death penalty case).
14. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, explained:
We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel
when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, and we decline to so
hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to
the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that
we establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals. We think that since a
defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a
discretionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no
such right when attacking a conviction that has long since become final upon
exhaustion of the appellate process.
Id. (citations omitted).
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assigned punishment does not provide free representation. 15 Perhaps the most
important ―difference‖ in capital punishment is better access to attorneys for
habeas review. 16 Thus, while capital defendants may find a hearing despite
AEDPA‘s restrictions, other defendants may not, leaving AEDPA‘s
restrictions important, even if not consistently enforced.
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE: HOW HABEAS WORKS
A. Who Can Petition for a Writ
Most criminal cases arise in state jurisdictions rather than in the federal
system. 17 Therefore, most ineffective assistance claims come from state court
proceedings. Although ineffectiveness claims are ordinarily grounded in the
Sixth Amendment,18 such claims could also rest on an independent state
ground guaranteed by a state‘s constitution. 19 The independent state ground
for relief must guarantee at least what the federal Constitution guarantees, but
it could hold state criminal courts and counsel to a higher standard. 20 The
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286, 289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(―Death is a unique punishment . . . . [D]eath . . . is in a class by itself.‖); id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (―[P]enalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind.‖).
17. YALE KAMISAR, W AYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 18 (12th ed. 2008) (―[W]hen the
federal system is compared to the state systems as a group, the combined state systems clearly
dominate, as they account for a much larger portion of the nation‘s criminal justice workload (e.g.,
roughly 96% of all felony prosecutions and over 99% of all misdemeanor prosecutions).‖).
18. The entire amendment provides that
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (―[T]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.‖). See also
WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007–2008).
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hager v. Marten, 594 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1999). The petitioner
applied to the state trial court for habeas relief on the ground that the state failed to comply with state
statutes governing inpatient competency examinations. Id. at 794. He argued that the failure to
follow the statute was a jurisdictional defect in his continuing confinement and required dismissal of
his criminal complaint. Id. at 795. In ruling on the matter, the court observed that ―[i]n a habeas
corpus action, we apply a de novo standard to issues of law . . . .‖ Id. The de novo standard of
review is more favorable to petitioners than is the deferential standard laid out in AEDPA. See infra
notes 56–60 and accompanying text. This holding illustrates how state laws can be more protective
of petitioner‘s rights than is required by the federal Constitution. But, if a prisoner relies solely on
state law, he cannot have recourse to the federal courts if the state decision goes against him.

550

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:545

prisoner raising only state law questions can appeal only to the highest courts
within her state.21
However, if a prisoner in state custody alleges she is held in violation of
the United States Constitution, a final decision by the highest state court need
not be the end of the road. When state appeals have been exhausted, 22 a
prisoner who believes her conviction was obtained in violation of the U.S.
Constitution has a right to petition federal courts for release from custody
through the writ of habeas corpus.23 This petition is a collateral attack on the
state conviction, alleging it was obtained in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.24
B. Habeas Filings Increase, but They Do Not Overwhelm Federal Courts
Before the 1950s, the Supreme Court rarely intervened in state
convictions. 25 The Court‘s willingness to consider these claims grew out of
rising political sensitivity stemming in part from the civil rights movement;
one commentator notes:
After World War II, however . . . [m]any critics, particularly
members of the civil rights movement, saw state judiciaries as
insensitive to defendants‘ constitutional rights and demanded
more extensive federal oversight of criminal law. In its 1953
decision Brown v. Allen, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded
the system of federal habeas corpus to provide such

21. See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, P OSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 1–13 (1981 & Supp.
2008); see, e.g., Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that where the state court
makes a finding prohibiting collateral review ―on an adequate and independent state procedural
ground,‖ the matter cannot be reviewed by a federal court on federal constitutional grounds).
22. The issue of just what constitutes exhaustion for purposes of habeas law is beyond the
scope of this Article, though it has garnered enormous attention in recent years. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) provides that application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it appears that ―the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.‖ Id. Nevertheless, ―[a]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of
the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.‖ Id. § 2254(b)(2). A good
and brief overview of this topic appears in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1443–46 (4th ed. 1996).
23. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27 (1963); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006), noting
that a court may ―set the judgment aside and . . . discharge the prisoner . . . .‖ The best overview of
how the writ of habeas corpus applies to state court prisoners appears in YACKLE, supra note 21,
§§ 17–21.
24. The word ―collateral‖ in this context means that the remedy ―provide[s] an avenue for
upsetting judgments that have become otherwise final.‖ Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
682–83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
25. See Blume, supra note 11, at 262–64. ―Brown v. Allen and its three subsequent decisions
establish[] the highwater mark of habeas . . . .‖ Id. at 262–63.
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supervision. 26
After the Brown ruling, federal courts became more willing to entertain
claims that state convictions rested on unconstitutional grounds. 27 For
example, in Rogers v. Richmond, the Court found a confession to be
involuntary when it emerged from a detective‘s threat to transport a
petitioner‘s invalid wife to the police station for questioning. 28 Similarly, the
Court reversed a conviction where interrogators told a woman that if she did
not ―cooperate,‖ her children would be taken from her, and she would be
deprived of state financial aid.29 Although state courts upheld these and
similar practices, federal courts condemned them on constitutional grounds.
Reaction to the expanded reach of habeas review was mixed. Some
perceived the expansion unfavorably.30 Simmering under the surface was a

26. Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 96 MICH. L. REV. 434, 434 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
27. See id. at 435.
28. 365 U.S. 534, 536, 545 (1961).
29. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). For further illustrations, the Court set out
more egregious practices related to obtaining confessions in Miranda v. Arizona:
In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Wakat v.
Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1958) (defendant suffering from broken
bones, multiple bruises and injuries sufficiently serious to require eight months‘
medical treatment after being manhandled by five policemen); Kier v. State, 213
Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957) (police doctor told accused, who was strapped to
a chair completely nude, that he proposed to take hair and skin scrapings from
anything that looked like blood or sperm from various parts of his body);
Bruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) (defendant held in
custody over two months, deprived of food for 15 hours, forced to submit to a
lie detector test when he wanted to go to the toilet); People v. Matlock, 51
Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959) (defendant questioned incessantly over an
evening‘s time, made to lie on cold board and to answer questions whenever it
appeared he was getting sleepy). Other cases are documented in American
Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division, Secret Detention by the Chicago Police
(1959); Potts, The Preliminary Examination and ―The Third Degree,‖ 2 Baylor
L. Rev. 131 (1950); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of
Confession, 14 J. Pub. L. 25 (1965).
384 U.S. 436, 446–47 n.7 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Khandelwal, supra note 26, at 436.
Victims and their families found habeas corpus a torturous process, prolonging
their agony by adding another layer of ―appeals‖ to an already overburdened
criminal justice system. It also led to inefficient expenditures of courts‘ time
and attention, with federal judges facing towering stacks of barely legible
handwritten petitions, very few of which were likely to raise valid constitutional
claims.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?—A Comment on
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (1990)
(―Many, therefore, have come to regard the Great Writ as a slap in the face of federalism.‖).
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sense that federal courts usurped the legitimate authority of the states. Justice
Frankfurter‘s admonition that ―the District Judge [must] decide constitutional
questions presented by a State prisoner even after his claims have been
carefully considered by the State courts‖31 illustrated what opponents of
expanded habeas review feared most: a black-robed ―Big Brother‖ looking
over their collective shoulders. On the other hand, the recognition of
petitioners‘ constitutional claims exercised a long-desired check on state
judges who placed too high a value on political expediency and too low a
value on rights of criminal defendants. 32
Those opposing the expanded availability of habeas review asserted that
federal courts were drowning in a sea of frivolous claims because federal
judges misunderstood both the realities of state criminal practice and the
proper use of habeas corpus.33 Prisoners did file habeas petitions more
frequently after Brown v. Allen; however, even twenty years ago, the late
Professor Frank Remington sagely noted that habeas actions were not
overburdening federal courts.34 Indeed, ―the limited enthusiasm displayed
over the elimination of federal court diversity jurisdiction‖ indicated that not
all believed that the claims of efficiency were paramount. 35 Remington
concluded that ―limiting the access of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus
is likely to have only a minor effect on the case load of federal courts.‖ 36

31. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
32. Blume, supra note 11, at 263–64.
33. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2332 (1993)
(―Over a career spanning forty years, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been witness to, or has participated
in, numerous efforts to import preclusion into the law of habeas corpus . . . .‖); see also Blume, supra
note 11, at 265–69, where Professor John H. Blume shows how the Court consistently restricted
habeas appeals. ―In each of these decisions, the majority focused on the interests of comity,
federalism, and finality—interests it believed prior habeas jurisprudence had significantly
undervalued.‖ Id. at 269 (footnotes omitted).
34. Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on
the Altars of Expediency, Federalism and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 339, 346
(1987–1988).
[T]he major increase in cases filed by state prisoners in federal courts is not in
habeas cases but rather in conditions-of-confinement cases brought by state
prisoners. For example, while the number of habeas cases handled by federal
magistrates increased from 4208 to 7184 during the decade starting in 1977,
state prisoner conditions-of-confinement cases increased from 2778 to
17,229 . . . . Nonetheless, proposals to alleviate the case load burden on the
federal courts continue to focus on habeas corpus petitions[,] . . . raising strong
doubts as to the sincerity of the reformers‘ purported primary concern with the
federal courts‘ case load.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Current scholarship supports Remington‘s predictions.37 Professor Blume
recently calculated that the intervention of federal courts into state convictions
is rare;38 only 0.62% of federal habeas petitions are successful. 39
Habeas claims continue to occupy only a relatively small part of the
federal docket. For example in June 2008, there were 1,409,422 inmates in
state prisons;40 they filed a total of 21,490 habeas petitions. 41 The total
number of civil suits commenced in federal courts in 2008 was 267,257. 42
Thus, habeas cases were 8% of that total.43 Personal injury and contract
actions take up a significantly greater share of federal courts‘ calendars, and
these suits do not necessarily raise issues of constitutional rights. 44 Further,
state criminal cases reach federal court not only through prisoners‘ petitions
but also through appeals by state prosecutors who challenge state court
decisions on federal constitutional issues. 45 Remington maintained that if
there were a difficulty with state sovereignty being set aside in these cases, the
difficulty lay not with prisoners but with prosecutors. 46 The foregoing helps
place any discussion of access to habeas review in a broader context.
III. THE BACKLASH AGAINST HABEAS: AEDPA AND THE COURTS
Limitations on habeas review began not with AEDPA‘s provisions but
with Supreme Court decisions under the leadership of Justices Harlan, Burger,
Powell, and Rehnquist.47 In Wainwright v. Sykes the Court acknowledged its
37. Professor Blume crunches the numbers in his article, which downplays the effects of
AEDPA. ―[G]iven the increase in the number of incarcerated persons, the actual number of petitions
filed per 1,000 inmates has decreased.‖ Blume, supra note 11, at 283 n.117. Thus, the increase in
the number of filings is less than would have been predicted given the greater number of prisoners in
the pool and may reveal that federal courts are reluctant to overturn state convictions.
38. Blume calculates the success rate of § 2254 cases as averaging 0.62% in the years between
1997 and 2004. Id. at 284 tbl.4.
39. Id.
40. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF
JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008, at 2 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
pim08st.pdf.
41. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 147 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/appendices/
C02ASep08.pdf.
42. Id. at 146.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Remington, supra note 34, at 348.
46. Id.
47. Blume, supra note 11, at 265; see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3. Professors
Tushnet and Yackle maintain that these statutes enacted after ―substantial judicial reconstruction of
the law‖ were ―largely symbolic.‖ Id. That is to say that these statutes really added nothing of
substance to what the courts had already done. Thus, ―[p]risoners and their advocates will not see the
AEDPA and [Prison Litigation Reform Act] as desirable statutes on the whole, but they will not find
them insuperable barriers either.‖ Id. at 84. Although a relatively adequate discussion of Supreme
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―willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ,
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained
unchanged.‖48 Commentators largely agree that congressional efforts to limit
habeas review—including AEDPA—were largely ―symbolic‖ or unnecessary
because the Court‘s own actions beat Congress to the punch. 49
Despite repeated analyses that habeas review was already constricted by
courts before the passage of AEDPA, 50 courts and practitioners usually
reference AEDPA when describing how habeas review is restricted. 51 Thus, it
is instructive to consider the key provision governing access to federal courts,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).52 Before AEDPA, the Court applied a
de novo standard of review to: (1) legal questions in which the petitioner
attacked the rule that the trial court used in the underlying case, and (2) mixed
questions of fact and law in which the petitioner challenged how the trial
court applied the law to the particular facts of her case. 53 Thus, the only cases
in which federal courts deferred to state court findings were questions of fact
determined by the trial court, presumably because trial judges were better able
to make determinations of credibility of the witnesses. 54 AEDPA changed the
law by requiring state prisoners to meet strict prerequisites before federal

Court precedent limiting access to habeas courts is beyond the scope of this Article, a clean
discussion appears in A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4–15 (2002). In
particular, Professor Bryant sketches out the roots of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and its
progeny. Id. Justice Harlan‘s objections to expanding habeas jurisdiction are set forth eloquently in
his concurrence to Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681–95 (1971).
48. 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
49. See Blume, supra note 11, at 297; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3.
50. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 11, at 297; Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 3; Yackle,
supra note 7, at 547.
51. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–
108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
Id.
53. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506–07 (1953).
54. Id. at 506.
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courts can consider the merits of their petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 55
The statute raises the level of deference due state court decisions by reviewing
federal judges. 56
The strength of the writ of habeas corpus depends in large part on how
easily petitioners can get into court.57 AEDPA seemed to make access to
federal court difficult.58 Under AEDPA, state court proceedings will not be
disturbed unless they rest on ―a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States‖ or a decision that was based on an
―unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
56. Although this provision is usually characterized as defining ―standards of review,‖ not all
commentators agree that this phrasing describes the situation with precision. See, e.g., Evan Tsen
Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User’s Manual, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 103, 107 (1998).
In colloquial terms, then, the new section 2254(d) prescribes ―standards of
review‖—that is, the standards by which federal habeas courts are to review
state court judgments. As a formal matter, this terminology is of dubious
validity; federal habeas corpus has always been classed as an original
proceeding whose function was to test the legality of a prisoner‘s custody
simpliciter. Federal habeas courts never formally reviewed state court
convictions in the way that appellate courts review trial court judgments.
Habeas corpus proceedings were collateral to judgments of conviction . . . .
[Nevertheless,] the new section 2254(d) governs the standard of review to be
employed in habeas proceedings in much the way that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) governs the standard of federal appellate review of federal
district court decisions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
57. Khandelwal, supra note 26, at 435.
If a federal court reviews a state judgment under a de novo standard of review,
it can grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever it simply disagrees with a state
court‘s constitutional interpretation. Alternatively, a deferential standard of
review greatly reduces the reach of a federal court‘s authority, as a federal court
may issue the writ only when it finds the state court‘s decision unreasonable—
not merely when it disagrees with that decision.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
58. But see Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond
Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 283 (2004).
The world of federal habeas corpus continues to be dominated by issues
arising from Congress‘s passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (―AEDPA‖). One of AEDPA‘s most notable innovations
was § 2254(d), which effectively requires federal habeas courts to accord state
court criminal convictions a sort of deference. The problem is that § 2254(d) is
unusually ambiguous with respect to how much and what sort of deference is
owed, and under what circumstances.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the State court proceeding.‖59 In Williams v. Taylor, the Court instructed that
the ―clearly established Federal law‖ prong was the threshold question. 60 In
that same case, Justice O‘Connor observed that clearly established federal law
―refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta‖ of Supreme Court decisions. 61
In finding that law is clearly established, the Court does not demand a narrow
holding directly on point; a state court‘s decision could be ―contrary to‖ or
―an unreasonable application of‖ Supreme Court precedent by ignoring the
―fundamental principles‖ established by the Court‘s most relevant
precedents.62
Finally, with regard to the unreasonable application of the clearly
established federal law prong, the Court recognizes a distinction between
rulings that bind lower courts with specificity and those whose analytical
framework is looser. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court observed that the
―range of reasonable judgment‖ depends on the rule upon which it relies. 63
Where the legal rule is specific, ―[a]pplications of the rule may be plainly
correct or incorrect.‖64 By contrast, ―[o]ther rules are more general, and their
meaning must emerge in application over the course of time.‖ 65 The Court
maintains that general rules call for more deference to lower court decisions

59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
60. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Some commentary questioned if the Court
simply excised the ―unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the
State Court proceeding‖ prong sub silentio in Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), wherein the
Court vacated and remanded a circuit court ruling granting the petitioner habeas relief. Id. at 77; see
Clearly Established Law, supra note 6, at 337. The Court based the Musladin decision solely on the
―clearly established federal law‖ prong and never mentioned the ―unreasonable det ermination of the
facts‖ prong. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77; see Clearly Established Law, supra note 6, at 337. Recent
Supreme Court cases undermine this thesis. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478
(2007) (ruling that ―it was not objectively unreasonable for that court to conclude that a defendant
who refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland
prejudice based on his counsel‘s failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence‖ seems to
rest on the ―unreasonable determination of the facts‖ prong).
61. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). In his concurrence to Carey v. Musladin, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice
O‘Connor‘s ―dictum about dicta,‖ which he understood as ―represent[ing] an incorrect interpretation
of the statute‘s text.‖ 549 U.S. at 79.
62. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 258 (2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). But
see Chief Justice Roberts‘s dissent: ―We give ourselves far too much credit in claiming that our
sharply divided, ebbing and flowing decisions in this area gave rise to ‗clearly established‘ federal
law.‖ Id. at 266 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010), in
which the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held that there was no ―clearly established‖ law
for purposes of a habeas challenge holding that a judge reviewing a Batson objection must
―personally observe[] and recall[]‖ the ―prospective juror‘s demeanor on which the explanation [for
striking the juror] is based.‖ Id. at 1172.
63. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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because they necessarily encompass a wider range of appropriate actions
applying the precedent in question. 66
The Fifth Circuit expresses the common understanding of how AEDPA‘s
language should be interpreted.67
An application of federal law is unreasonable only when
―reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one
view that the state court ruling was incorrect.‖ . . . Thus,
AEDPA‘s standard of review both restricts the federal habeas
court‘s review of state factual determinations, and interjects
certain limitations upon the federal habeas court‘s review of
legal conclusions that were not present under pre-AEDPA
law. 68
IV. PROBLEMS WITH AEDPA MAY REINVIGORATE A MORIBUND
BODY OF LAW
A. AEDPA’s Roots in the “Contract with America”
As Professors Tushnet and Yackle note, AEDPA was a direct descendant
of proposals in the 1994 Republican Contract with America‘s ―Taking Back
Our Streets Act.‖69 The legislation passed through Congress with little
discussion.70 Following the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, Congress rode the wave of populist outrage directed at
perceived threats from domestic terrorism. 71 Congressional leaders ―seized
66. Id. The logic of this ―specific rule versus general rule‖ distinction may go further and
undermine the possibility of finding clearly established federal law in the first place. See, e.g.,
Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 266 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Whether a rule is characterized as a general
rule that calls for more deference to lower court determinations or as failing to constitute clearly
established federal law, the result is similar: the petitioner will not prevail in his application for a writ
of habeas corpus. See id.
67. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 603 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d
173, 181 (5th Cir. 1999)).
68. Id.
69. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 11, at 20–21. Arguing that ―most petitions are totally
lacking in merit,‖ that
―thousands upon thousands of frivolous petitions clog the federal district court
dockets each year,‖ and that ―prisoners on death row [could] almost indefinitely
delay their punishment,‖ the Contract‘s authors sought to impose a one-year
deadline for filing habeas corpus claims generally, and a more stringent sixmonth deadline for capital cases.
Id. (quoting CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY
AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 44 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
70. Yackle, supra note 7, at 545–48, 551–53.
71. Id. at 545–46.
The drafting work fell to staff lawyers serving the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Those drafters did not simply select a prior bill as their model. Nor
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the opportunity finally to limit federal courts‘ authority in habeas corpus . . .
in ordinary cases in which prisoners use habeas to challenge criminal
convictions or sentences.‖72 The haste and underlying political agenda
resulted in Professor Yackle‘s assessment that habeas corpus for state
prisoners is an ―intellectual disaster area.‖73 In a similar vein, Justice Souter
observed in Lindh v. Murphy, ―[a]ll we can say is that in a world of silk purses
and pigs‘ ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.‖ 74
AEDPA‘s drafters made two unsupported assumptions that this Article
will develop below. Initially, they ignored the historical roots of habeas
corpus; in so doing, they assumed that habeas jurisdiction is granted solely by
statute. This assumption is disputed by legal historians and courts. Secondly,
the drafters misperceived how statutory law and case precedent differ as
binding authority. These two difficulties give weight to Professor Yackle‘s
observation that AEDPA is conceptually flawed. 75 An understanding of these
assumptions may provide petitioners and their attorneys with new tools to
challenge state court convictions or sentences.76
B. The Right to Habeas Corpus Is Both Constitutional and Statutory
As a general observation, it matters if the source of a given right is
constitutional or statutory. Two different sources have been cited as
grounding the federal courts‘ power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. 77
did they start afresh. The occasion was ripe for anything, and they emptied the
committee files of virtually all the restrictive . . . procedural requirements that
Republicans had tried to impose on all convicts . . . . The bill shot through
committee in both bodies and went to the floor without an explanatory report.
The floor debates were extensive, but scarcely rigorous. The bill was adopted
by main force, and President Clinton signed it into law (though perhaps
dubitante).
Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 546.
73. Id. at 553 (footnote omitted).
74. 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
75. See Yackle, supra note 7, at 548. ―The manner in which AEDPA was cobbled together
suggests that no one thought any of this through at a conceptual level.‖ Id. The two observations
discussed in this Article can be seen as further examples of the AEDPA‘s conceptual inadequacies to
which Professor Yackle refers.
76. See CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 13 (2007) (―[A]ll beliefs are held within a context
or framework of the taken-for-granted, which usually remains tacit, and may even be as yet
unacknowledged by the agent, because never formulated.‖). Id. The next section of this Article tries
to explore the frameworks that operated beneath the surface of the drafters‘ work and indicates how
difficulties with those assumptions undermine the stated goals of the law they drafted.
77. YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77; Professor Peter J. Smith‘s important recent article,
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883 (2008), observes how textualists on the
Court limit access to courts despite expansive grants of jurisdiction laid out in congressional statutes.
Smith indicates that the textualists‘ urge to constrain judicial power may trump their competing
demands to act as faithful agents of Congress who should focus merely on the plain meaning of the

2009]

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AFTER AEDPA

559

Ordinarily, authorities cite the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its amendments,
which derive power from Article III of the Constitution. 78 As a result, federal
habeas jurisdiction is seen as statutory and thus a matter of congressional
control.79 In accord with that view, the Supreme Court has noted that
jurisdiction to challenge state and federal judgments comes from 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.80
Appreciation of this statutory basis for habeas jurisdiction is necessary,
but it is not sufficient. Justice Black cautioned against efforts to restrict
access to habeas review: ―Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against
illegal imprisonment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts
cannot . . . be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.‖81
Black‘s statement rests in part upon the reference to the writ of habeas
corpus in the Suspension Clause, which reads: ―The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.‖ 82 Likewise, Professor LaFave
jurisdictional statutes as written. Id. at 1947–48. Though his concerns are strictly beyond the scope
of this study, Smith‘s indication that Justices may not be motivated by considerations beyond that of
the text alone is surely germane to this Article.
78. YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77.
79. Id.
80. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children‘s Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 509 n.9 (1982). This
reading gains support from no less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall, who seemed to assert it
in Aaron Burr‘s conspiracy case, Ex parte Bollman, in which Marshall said that federal power to
grant the writ ―must be given by written law,‖ 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807), and commentators
agree that in context he meant statutory law, YACKLE, supra note 21, at 77 (citing Bollman, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) at 94). Marshall‘s opinion has come under attack. Professor Francis Paschal argues that
modern courts should read the Suspension Clause as ―a directive to all superior courts of record, state
as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available.‖ Francis Paschal, The
Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607. Paschal observed that Chief Justice
Marshall held in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that Article III of the
Constitution exhausted the possibilities of original jurisdiction for the federal courts. Id. at 626.
Paschal maintains that in Marbury, ―Marshall had simply forgotten the habeas corpus clause . . . .‖
Paschal, supra, at 651. The weight of current scholarship accepts Professor Paschal‘s view. See,
e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t
Make It So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (pt. 1), 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000); see also James E.
Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1433 (2000).
81. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 798 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). More recently,
Justice Blackmun noted a number of problems with the law of federal habeas corpus, which he
described as ―a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the
vindication of federal rights.‖ Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
82. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2; see generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The
Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575
(2008). Professors Halliday and White maintain that the Suspension Clause extends the applicability
of the writ much more broadly than is presently thought. See id. at 713. Indeed, they argue that the
historical record ―suggests that, ‗at a minimum‘ the writ of habeas, in 1789, was taken as extending
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underscores this line of authority:
[The Suspension Clause] suggests that federal courts have the
inherent authority to issue the writ in the absence of a valid
suspension. Such a reading would establish, in effect, a
constitutional right to habeas relief, at least to the extent such
relief was available at common law, for persons held in
custody.83
In dictum, the Court has noted that jurisdictional statutes ―implement[] the
constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available.‖ 84
There is no indication AEDPA‘s drafters appreciated the Court‘s recognition
of a constitutional basis for habeas review, and the Supreme Court in its first
AEDPA case noted that even if AEDPA can restrict habeas claims, the
constitutional basis for habeas at least preserves the Supreme Court‘s own
power to grant habeas petitions. 85 The Court so held unanimously in Felker v.
Turpin,86 finding the AEDPA habeas restrictions permissible in part because
the Supreme Court retains its own habeas power under the text of the
Constitution.87
If courts continue to accept Justice Black‘s contention that granting the
writ is rooted in the Constitution, they should also accept at least one
important corollary: insofar as habeas review is a constitutional matter, access
to courts should be analyzed in terms of the fundamental rights granted
criminal defendants, including the right to a fair trial. In Estes v. Texas, the
Supreme Court announced that the right to a fair trial is the most fundamental
right of criminal defendants.88 To secure this right, a number of ancillary
rights must be enforced. For example, freedom of the press may be impeded

to natural subjects or citizens and resident aliens in British and American territory.‖ Id. They then
tease out implications of this finding, raising a number of questions about the sort of review that
should be granted prisoners at Guantanamo. Id. at 714. If the Suspension Clause is seen as
demanding expanded review for non-citizen prisoners at an offshore military prison, it may likewise
demand expanded review for citizen prisoners held here in the U.S. See also Robert D. Sloane,
AEDPA’s “Adjudication on the Merits” Requirement: Collateral Review, Federalism, and Comity,
78 ST. JOHN ‘S L. REV. 615, 624–28 (2004).
83. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.2,
at 1293 (3d ed. 2000).
84. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963). See Halliday & White, supra note 82, at
578 n.2. ―[T]he Supreme Court has never squarely held that ‗the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus‘ amounts to an affirmative constitutional right to habeas review. It came perilously close to
doing so in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 304 (2001), but stopped short.‖ Id.
85. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 654 (1996).
86. Id.
87. See Scott Moss, Recent Developments, An Appeal by Any Other Name: Congress’s Empty
Victory over Habeas Rights—Felker v. Turpin, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249, 252 (1997).
88. 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
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to avoid contaminating a jury pool before trial.89 Defendants have the right to
discover exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution. 90 Finally, indigent
defendants are guaranteed the right to government-provided attorneys to assist
in their defense for both felony and misdemeanor charges. 91
Because the authority for habeas relief is at least unclear, and both
historical evidence and Supreme Court authority root habeas corpus in the
Constitution itself, 92 courts may consider expanding jurisdiction in some cases
beyond the narrow grants of statute. At the very least, where the violation
affects a petitioner‘s right to fair trial, there are strong reasons for expanding
federal court jurisdiction to cases thought untouchable because of AEDPA‘s
restrictions.
C. AEDPA Assumes Precedent Binds as Statutory Authority Does; It Doesn’t
Another resource for reinvigorating access to habeas review relies less on
constitutional history and more on the jurisprudential claims undergirding
AEDPA. Supreme Court cases construing AEDPA limit ―clearly established
Federal law‖ to ―the holdings . . . of [the Supreme] Court‘s decisions as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.‖93 Although there is some
disagreement, even within the Court, about how ―clearly established . . . at the
time‖ should be parsed,94 the Justices agree that the ―clearly established‖
language is designed to restrict the ability of courts to review cases brought by
state court petitioners.95 Justice Scalia has observed that the law cannot
change via the grant of the petition. 96 The reviewing court—including the

89. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
90. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88
(1963).
91. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–
40 (1963).
92. See Halliday & White, supra note 82, at 575.
93. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O‘Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the
Court with respect to Part II, concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
94. Justice Scalia defines the legal requirement as limiting precedent that can be cited to that
which is ―‗clearly established‘ . . . at the time of the [lower court] decision.‖ Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). By contrast, Justice O‘Connor maintains in the majority
opinion that it is sufficient that the prior case merely be before the Court on habeas review.
―Contrary to the dissent‘s contention, we therefore made no new law in resolving Williams‘
ineffectiveness claim.‖ Id. at 522 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 543. As indicated below, only gradually has the Court moved away from Justice
Scalia‘s characterization of the law as ―unable to change.‖ As noted above, in Yarborough v.
Alvarado, the Court noted that some rules require narrow application because of their specificity
while others display more play in the joints. 541 U.S 652, 664 (2004). This past term, Justice
Thomas identified the Strickland standard as being a ―general standard‖ that grants state courts ―even
more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.‖ Knowles v.
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Supreme Court—must apply the law as it has been previously determined by
the Supreme Court.97
But what does it mean to say that case precedent cannot change? The
answer is far from clear. It is easiest to approach this subject obliquely by
distinguishing between statutory interpretation and the interpretation of
precedent. The clarity of statutory authority makes it uniquely attractive as a
source of law.98 It is no accident that Justice Scalia‘s textualist approach finds
a congenial home in statutory interpretation. 99 Law in this vein is best
understood through the lens of Sutherland: Statutes and Statutory
Construction and is rooted in a series of assumptions of how law works. 100
Namely, words and phrases have a fixed meaning, 101 and therefore, the
interpreter can apply the canons of construction relatively easily. 102 Law
Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009).
97. Williams, 529 U.S at 412.
98. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14
(13th ed. 1946).
Where does the judge find the law which he embodies in his judgment? There
are times when the source is obvious. The rule that fits the case may be
supplied by the constitution or by statute. If that is so, the judge looks no
farther. The correspondence ascertained, his duty is to obey. The constitution
overrides a statute, but a statute, if consistent with the constitution, overrides the
law of judges. In this sense, judge-made law is secondary and subordinate to
the law that is made by legislators.
Id.
99. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION : FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
But though I have no quarrel with the common law and its process, I do
question whether the attitude of the common-law judge—the mind-set that asks,
―What is the most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any
impediments to the achievement of that result be evaded?‖—is appropriate for
most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state judges do. We live
in an age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law. As one legal
historian has put it, in modern times ―the main business of government, and
therefore of law, [is] legislative and executive. . . . Even private law, so-called,
[has been] turning statutory.
Id. at 13.
100. See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND : STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Thomson West 7th ed. 2008) (1891). Despite Justice Scalia‘s
commendation of SUTHERLAND : STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, the current edition
questions Scalia‘s approach to statutory construction. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain
Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, in 3 SINGER & SINGER
§ 65A:10, at 717–59, supra.
101. See, e.g., 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 100, § 46:1, at 137.
102. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 99, at 25–29; see generally 3 SINGER & SINGER, supra note
100, §§ 57:1–57:26, at 2–98 (laying out the rules for mandatory and directory construction). But see
Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, in 3 SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 100, § 65A:6, at 663–76. Judge Posner does not directly mention Scalia‘s work,
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under a statutory model is understood as a collection of rules stated with
clarity and designed to apply universally within a given jurisdiction. 103
Further, statutory law is understood as applying in the same way at all times
until it is repealed. 104 The deeper implication is that unless the statute is
inartfully drafted, there cannot be disagreement about what the law is or what
it entails; those who differ in interpreting an unambiguous statute are either
dishonest, self-deluded, or dull. 105
Although textualism is a popular approach to statutory interpretation,
matters are perforce different when interpreting case law or constitutional
precedent. 106 As Professor Duxbury observes, case precedent, in contrast to
statutory authority, is a disfavored source for law because the rule can be
but he develops his argument based on the premise attacked directly by Scalia.
The usual criticism of the canons, forcefully advanced by Professor
Llewellyn many years ago, is that for every canon one might bring to bear on a
point there is an equal and opposite canon, so that the outcome of the
interpretive process depends on the choice between paired opposites—a choice
the canons themselves do not illuminate.
Id. at 663.
103. This view is subject to critique in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994):
The ―ORIGINAL INTENT‖ and ―plain meaning‖ rhetoric in American statutory
interpretation scholarship and decisions treats statutes as static texts and
assumes that the meaning of a statute is fixed from the date of enactment. The
implication is that a legislator interpreting the statute at the time of enactment
would—or should—render the same interpretation as an agency or judge
interpreting the same statute fifty years later. This is a dubious description of
practical reality, and a dreary aspiration for our polity. These dubieties suggest
that we might also doubt the assumptions embedded within the originalist
rhetoric of statutory interpretation.
Id. at 9 (typeface in original).
104. Id.
105. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE 8 (1986). This approach is best described by
Professor Dworkin in his rendering of the ―plain fact‖ theory of the law:
Most laymen assume that there is law in the books decisive of every issue that
might come before a judge. The academic version of the plain-fact view denies
this. The law may be silent on the issue in play, it insists, because no past
institutional decision speaks to it either way.
Id.
106. Carleton Kemp Allen, Precedent and Logic, 41 L. Q. REV. 329, 334 (1925).
The ‗binding force‘ of precedents has, through constant and often unthinking
repetition, become a kind of sacramental phrase which contains a large element
of fiction. If a Court is quite clear about the rule of law which should be applied
to the case before it, it will seldom allow itself to be embarrassed by an
inconvenient decision. There are many ways of ‗distinguishing,‘ and a bad case
. . . is soon distinguished out of existence.
Id.
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difficult to understand, difficult to derive, and difficult to demarcate around
the edges. 107 Professor Schauer maintains that when dealing with case law,
we are dealing not with binding rules as we are with statutes; rather, we are
dealing with authority to be followed. 108 Courts redraw and re-conceive
categories set out by earlier precedent. 109 These categorical distinctions in
107. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 92 (2008).
The casual nature of judicial precedents—the fact that judges are generally
free to say as much or as little as they like, the likelihood that there will be no
canonical form of words capturing the ratio decidendi of a case, the difficulty of
determining in many instances just what is the ratio decidendi as opposed to
obiter dicta—means that they are not particularly efficient vessels for
conveying important legal information.
Id. at 92; see also Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 891–92
(2006). Professor Schauer sets out the challenge thusly:
I mean to pose a skeptical challenge to one pervasive argument for the common
law and against its alternatives. And that argument is that one reason (and not
necessarily the only reason, and not necessarily the best reason) to prefer the
common law is that rulemaking and lawmaking are better done when the
rulemaker has before her a live controversy, a controversy that enables her to
see all of the real world implications of making one rule rather than another.
When there is no actual dispute, so the argument goes, everything is
speculation, and speculation that is not rooted in real world events is especially
likely to be misguided.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
At the end of his analysis, Professor Schauer offers the following conclusion: ―Yet when we
combine the lessons of at least one strand of Legal Realism with some of the lessons of modern
social science, we see as well that real events, real parties, real controversies, and real consequences
may have distorting effects as well as illuminating ones.‖ Id. at 918. Schauer suggests that case law
may thus come to decisions that are not in the best interests of society and should be treated with
wariness by courts and counsel. Id.
108. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 591–92 (1987).
Because the constraint of precedent might not be an all-or-nothing affair,
we must consider the way in which the size of the categories of assimilation
might largely determine the strength of precedent. This is admittedly an odd
way of thinking about weight, because it is more common to think of the
question of size and the question of strength as lying along different axes. But
when we turn to precedent this distinction between size and strength collapses.
It might occur to us to say that precedent provides one reason for a
particular decision without providing a conclusive reason.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 112–13.
[I]n the main there shall be adherence to precedent. There shall be symmetrical
development, consistently with history or custom when history or custom has
been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape to existing rules, and
with logic or philosophy when the motive power has been theirs. But
symmetrical development may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases
to be a good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest
served by symmetry or certainty must then be balanced against the social

2009]

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AFTER AEDPA

565

turn emphasize or subordinate earlier holdings and affect how relevant earlier
cases are to the case at hand. 110 Schauer, among others, indicates that there is
no way to correct for this fluctuation in meaning; therefore, precedent cannot
provide conclusive guidance as a source of law.111
Although the many distinctions between statutory law and case precedent
as sources of legal authority are beyond the scope of this Article, one
difference helps explain why AEDPA cannot work as some courts have
claimed. Professors Jonsen and Toulmin observe that one virtue of the case
method is its ability to manage conflicts that general propositional rules
cannot address.112 In particular, the case method recognizes the virtue of
indeterminacy, leaving certain questions undertheorized or incompletely
explored to gain agreement from a wide spectrum of viewpoints. 113 As
Professor Sunstein notes, parties may agree on particular conclusions or broad
ideas of justice, even if they do not employ the same chains of reasoning in
precisely the same way. 114
interest served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare. These
may enjoin upon the judge the duty of drawing the line at another angle, of
staking the path along new courses, of marking a new point of departure from
which others who come after him will set out upon their journey.
Id.
110. Id.
111. Schauer, supra note 108, at 591–92.
112. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF
MORAL REASONING 9 (1988).
In morality, as in law and public administration, the assumption that all
practical decisions need to rest on a sufficiently clear and general system of
invariable rules or principles has, from a theoretical point of view, a certain
attractiveness. But in the actual business of dealing with particular real-life
cases and situations, such rules and principles can never takes us more than part
of the way. The real-life application of moral, legal, and administrative rules
calls always for the exercise of human perceptiveness and discernment—what
has traditionally been referred to as ―equity‖—and the more problematic the
situations become, the greater is the need for such discernment.
Id.
113. Id. at 314.
The heart of moral experience does not lie in a mastery of general rules and
theoretical principles, however sound and well reasoned those principles may
appear. It is located, rather, in the wisdom that comes from seeing how the
ideas behind those rules work out in the course of people‘s lives: in particular,
seeing more exactly what is involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that
rule in one or another set of circumstances. Only experience of this kind will
give individual agents the practical priorities that they need in weighing moral
considerations of different kinds and resolving conflicts between those different
considerations.
Id.; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND P OLITICAL CONFLICT 35–61 (1996).
114. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 35.
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This incomplete theorization enhances social cohesion by permitting
agreement on broad principles, and it opens legal reasoning to broader sorts of
concerns—and perhaps less elegant formulation—than argument based on
propositional rules permits.115 Case law thus enhances agreement among
different parties for what may be different reasons; it has more ―play in the
joints‖ than does statutory law. Professor Duxbury notes how this openness
leads to development of law:
If judges were bound by precedents much as they are bound
by statutes, the opportunities for judge-made law to evolve
would be considerably limited; but if precedents had
absolutely no capacity to constrain, there would be no point
to the doctrine of stare decisis. The idea of precedents having
authority is meant to capture the fact that the truth lies
somewhere between these two extremes, that the law that
courts create is the law they often feel obligated and are
obligated to follow.116
Judge-made law can and does evolve and change; this adaptability is one of
its strengths.
Precedent thus provides not a binding rule but a departure point for judges
contemplating similar sets of facts.117 Professor Duxbury suggests that

Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in law and society. It
is quite rare for a person or group completely to theorize any subject, that is, to
accept both a general theory and a series of steps connecting that theory to
concrete conclusions. Thus we often have in law an incompletely theorized
agreement on a general principle—incompletely theorized in the sense that
people who accept the principle need not agree on what it entails in particular
cases.
Id.
115. JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 112, at 299.
Some philosophers, such as Henry Sidgwick, find practical ethics messy or
untidy and welcome the formal elegance of an [sic] nicely framed ethical
analysis. Sidgwick‘s preference was neither eccentric nor transitory: quite
recently, in a similar spirit we find Jonathan Glover complaining about the
―baroque complexity‖ of practical morals . . . . But this aesthetic preference
operates only on an intellectual level. If we allow our passion for simplicity and
elegance to affect our moral decisions in practice, we risk errors in moral
judgment . . . .
Id. (endnote omitted).
116. DUXBURY, supra note 107, at 23–24.
117. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 19–20.
The first thing [a judge confronting a new case] does is to compare the
case before him with the precedents, whether stored in his mind or hidden in the
books. I do not mean that precedents are ultimate sources of the law, supplying
the sole equipment that is needed for the legal armory . . . . Back of precedents
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precedent is helpfully understood as providing the framework for future
decision making.118 Justice Cardozo suggests an accretion model in which
new cases build on the frameworks set out in older cases. 119 H.L.A. Hart
maintains that what gives the legal system intelligibility is that judges in fact
do follow precedent. 120 But just what different jurists mean when they claim
to follow precedent is unsettled. 121
Because case law develops and binds in ways different from statutory law,
cases governed by AEDPA are not strictly tied to prior authority because of
the odd way the statute is structured. Rather than attempting to codify the

are the basic juridical conceptions which are the postulates of judicial reasoning,
and farther back are the habits of life, the institutions of society, in which those
conceptions had their origin, and which, by a process of interaction, they have
modified in turn. None the less, in a system so highly developed as our own,
precedents have so covered the ground that they fix the point of departure from
which the labor of the judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to
examine and compare them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be
need of nothing more. Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our
law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
118. See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 107, at 94.
Precedents, on this account, resemble what cognitive theorists term
availability heuristics. When decision-makers recognize that their capacity to
obtain and assimilate information is limited, they tend to devise procedures and
mechanisms which establish a link between a body of existing information they
might confidently use and the decisions they have to make.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. CARDOZO, supra note 98, at 48.
These fundamental conceptions once attained form the starting point from
which are derived new consequences, which, at first tentative and groping, gain
by reiteration a new permanence and certainty. In the end, they become
accepted themselves as fundamental and axiomatic. So it is with the growth
from precedent to precedent. The implications of a decision may in the
beginning be equivocal. New cases by commentary and exposition extract the
essence. At last there emerges a rule or principle which becomes a datum, a
point of departure, from which new lines will be run . . . .
Id.
120. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (1961). The difficulty for Hart is determining
just what following precedent means. From his perspective, judges perform different actions when
they claim to follow precedent.
The acknowledgement of precedent as a criterion of legal validity means
different things in different systems, and in the same system at different times.
Descriptions of the English ‗theory‘ of precedent are, on certain points, still
highly contentious: indeed, even the key terms used in the theory, ‗ratio
decidendi‘, ‗material facts‘, ‗interpretation‘, have their own penumbra of
uncertainty.
Id.
121. Id.
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holdings of earlier cases, AEDPA simply points to prior Supreme Court cases
as extrinsic objects and refers courts to them as sources of authority,
ostensibly suggesting that by so doing, they impose a requirement of strict
interpretation of earlier precedent. 122 Because the announced authority,
Supreme Court cases, are simply judge-made law, and because legal rules
stemming from cases are necessarily revisable in a way that congressionally
enacted or statutory law is not, AEDPA fails to bind later courts as a statute
codifying prior case law would. Despite its stated purpose, AEDPA does not
impart some ―super-precedential power‖ on earlier cases. This conclusion is
borne out by examining how Strickland has been interpreted by federal courts.
V. FIRST CRACK AT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: STRICKLAND
A. The Court Vaguely Defines Ineffective Assistance
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to an attorney,
although the substance of that right continues to evolve.123 In McMann v.
Richardson, the Court recognized that ―the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.‖124 Not until Strickland v. Washington did the
Court flesh out important contours of this right.125 Although earlier cases stated
that counsel must be ―effective,‖ the Court‘s pre-Strickland decisions considered
only affirmative governmental interference with representation rather than
addressing the substance of a defense attorney‘s actions or omissions.126
The Strickland rule is addressed to ―whether counsel‘s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.‖ 127 The Court extended
this standard to capital sentencing hearings as well because they are
―sufficiently like a trial in . . . adversarial format and in the existence of
122. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be fair,
the statute itself does not make these claims; however, that certainly is the interpretation textualists
impart to it. See id.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
Id.
124. 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citations omitted).
125. 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). ―The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the
constitutional requirement of effective assistance in . . . those [cases] presenting claims of ‗actual
ineffectiveness.‘‖ Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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standards for decision.‖128 Strickland‘s holding is commonly expressed as a
two-part test. The first prong requires that the defendant prove that trial
counsel‘s performance was deficient.129 Second, the defendant must prove
that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 130 The vague test for
the deficient performance prong is whether counsel‘s representation fell
below ―objective standard[s] of reasonableness.‖ 131 The performance prong is
evaluated using law and standards from the time of the trial or sentencing
itself.132 By contrast, the prejudice prong is evaluated using law that exists at
the time of the ineffectiveness challenge. 133 This prong can be found where
there is a ―reasonable probability‖ that the result of the proceeding would
have been different, but for counsel‘s error. 134
This two-part test is contextualized by an admonition that reviewing
courts indulge a strong presumption in favor of counsel‘s effectiveness. 135
Therefore, the Court directed:
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel‘s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 688. To prove deficiency, the Court stated that The Defense Function, ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (current version at ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-1.1 to
4-8.6 (3d ed. 1993)), is a guide to determining what is reasonable. Nevertheless, ―[no] particular set
of detailed rules for counsel‘s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant.‖ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. Justice O‘Connor observed, ―More specific
guidelines are not appropriate.‖ Id. at 688. Despite that assertion, the wide range of findings of what
does or does not constitute deficiency in the lower courts indicates that lower courts would have
appreciated some guidance here. See infra Part VI.
132. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89.
133. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371 (1993).
134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
135. Id. at 689.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential. It is
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel‘s assistance after
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining
counsel‘s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.
Id.
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defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ―might be considered
sound trial strategy.‖136
As might be expected on the basis of this presumption, following the
decision Strickland served more to limit the pool of litigants than expand it. 137
Anecdotally, Strickland was referred to as establishing ―the breathing
standard.‖ So long as counsel drew breath and sat next to her client without
doing anything aggressively stupid, the representation passed constitutional
muster.
B. Rules Without Facts Are Ambiguous and May Be Misleading
The Strickland rule as presented above ignores the facts that anchored the
original decision. That position is untenable if one wishes to chart how the
law has changed.138 One oversimplified way of thinking of the interaction of
law and facts is to think of a given rule of law as a filter. By announcing the
rule of law, a court thereby identifies certain sorts of facts as relevant and
other facts as irrelevant.139 For example, the crime of burglary occurs when a
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001). ―The Strickland standard
is rigorous, and the great majority of habeas petitions that allege constitutionally ineffective counsel
founder on that standard.‖ Id.
138. Indeed, one strategy for ignoring inconvenient precedent is simply to cite abstract legal
rules in the absence of any factual grounding. Rather than tying these propositions to concrete
situations, the judge acts as though law is made up of idealized, atemporal, and necessary
propositions. Professors Jonsen and Toulmin demonstrate that this sort of reasoning is simply
irrelevant in practical fields such as medicine, law, or ethics:
[P]ractical fields such as law, medicine, and public administration deal with
concrete actual cases, not with abstract idealized situations. They are directly
concerned with immediate facts about specific situations and individuals:
general ideas concern them only indirectly, as they bear on the problems of
those particular individuals. Unlike natural scientists, who are free to decide in
advance which types of situations, cases, or individuals they may (or need not)
pay attention to, physicians, lawyers, and social service workers face myriad
professional problems the moment any client walks through the door. . . .
[T]hey cannot choose to ignore them or their problems.
JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 112, at 31.
Thus, to separate legal rules from the facts that ground them is to act as though law were a
theoretical field like geometry, which proceeds along this idealized, atemporal, and necessary sort of
reasoning. This sort of reasoning applied to law is at best mistaken. Professors Jonsen and Toulmin
observe:
[I]f we fight off this bewitchment by the dream of an ethical algorithm—a
universal and invariable code of procedures capable of providing unique and
definitive answers to all our moral questions—it quickly becomes clear that
even the best set of rules or principles cannot by itself satisfy our expectations.
Id. at 7.
139. See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J.
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perpetrator enters the dwelling of another with the intent to steal or to commit
a felony therein.140 Whether the place illegally entered is owned rather than
rented is not relevant to the question: ―Did a burglary occur?‖ Therefore, if
someone is applying the rule of the law of burglary correctly, the distinction
made between one who owns and one who rents the affected property will be
filtered out; it simply does not figure into determining if a burglary happened.
If the distinction between renting and owning a dwelling becomes legally
important, then one is no longer dealing with the same law of burglary; once
this distinction becomes important, one has shifted to a different legal
category.
This relationship between facts and law may be expressed in two abstract
corollary presumptions that derive from the above example. When facts of
sort X which were once vital to determining the outcome of law A, are no
longer considered when courts apply law A, we can say that law A has
changed. Similarly, when facts of sort Y, which were once irrelevant to
determination of law B, become the linchpin of the argument for the
application and decision by courts applying law B, we can say that law B has
changed. These presumptions do not tell us what the law is at a given time,
but they do indicate a way of determining if a given law has changed.
The Court underscored this relationship between facts and law in Williams
161, 169 (1930).
The same set of facts may look entirely different to two different persons. The
judge founds his conclusions upon a group of facts selected by him as material
from among a larger mass of facts, some of which might seem significant to a
layman, but which, to a lawyer, are irrelevant. The judge, therefore, reaches a
conclusion upon the facts as he sees them. It is on these facts that he bases his
judgment, and not on any others. It follows that our task in analyzing a case is
not to state the facts and the conclusion, but to state the material facts as seen by
the judge and his conclusion based on them. It is by his choice of the material
facts that the judge creates law. A congeries of facts is presented to him; he
chooses those which he considers material and rejects those which are
immaterial, and then bases his conclusion upon the material ones. To ignore his
choice is to miss the whole point of the case. Our system of precedent becomes
meaningless if we say that we will accept his conclusion but not his view of the
facts. His conclusion is based on the material facts as he sees them, and we
cannot add or subtract from them by proving that other facts existed in the case.
Id.
140. MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES § 221.1 (1985).
(1) Burglary Defined. A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building
or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with
purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to
the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter. It is an affirmative
defense to prosecution for burglary that the building or structure was
abandoned.
Id.
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v. Taylor, the first major post-AEDPA case to interpret Strickland.141 The
Williams Court attempted to define what Congress meant by its use of the
language, ―unreasonable application of . . . clearly established federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.‖142 An ―unreasonable application‖ of
Supreme Court precedent occurs when ―a state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and
arrives at a result opposite to [that precedent].‖ 143 Or to put it in the abstract:
when facts of sort Y occur, a lower court applies the law ―unreasonably‖ when
it arrives at a conclusion different from the Supreme Court when it
encountered facts of sort Y. The cases below demonstrate that this standard
has not been applied consistently.
It is difficult to chart changes in the law because the relationship between
facts and law is neither stable nor static; facts condition and refine legal norms
that are under consideration as a matter of course. The French philosopher
Paul Ricoeur described this mutual conditioning:
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex operation
where the interpretation of the facts and the interpretation of
the norm mutually condition each other, before ending in the
qualification by which it is said that some allegedly criminal
behavior falls under such and such a norm which is said to
have been violated. If we begin with the interpretation of the
facts, we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of
interconnected facts can be considered and, let us say,
recounted. . . . We never finish untangling the lines of the
personal story of an accused with certainty, and even reading
it in such a way is already oriented by the presumption that
such an interconnectedness places the case under some rule.
To say that a is a case of B is already to decide that the
juridical syllogism holds for it.144
Relevant legal categories are determined by the interplay among
constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, and case precedent on the one
hand and the facts that ground a particular dispute on the other. 145 As
141. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
143. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
144. PAUL RICOEUR, LE JUSTE (1995), translated in THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 2000).
145. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, SHIKUL DAAT SHIPUTY (1987), translated in JUDICIAL
DISCRETION 17 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ. Press 1989) (1987).
The distinction among the three objects of judicial discretion is blurred. The
difficulty is inherent in the fact that we do not have accurate instruments for
determining what constitutes a fact and what a norm, and where the border
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Professor Aharon Barak notes, the categories of fact and the legal norms
applied to those facts remain porous and permeable. 146 Law and fact
condition and illuminate each other such that they cannot easily be
separated.147
C. Strickland Changed Lower Court Rulings by Ignoring Facts
Justice O‘Connor‘s decision in Strickland ignored lower courts‘ specific
findings of fact that grounded their conclusion that Washington received
constitutionally ineffective representation.148 The lower courts noted that he
came from a home marked by violence, abuse, and incest. 149 His murders
were extraordinarily grisly and sexual. 150 All involved stabbings or shootings
at point blank range that would have covered the defendant in copious
amounts of blood.151 Two stabbings occurred while the victims were in
bed. 152 In the first, the victim was presumably unclothed. 153 In the third
killing, the defendant stabbed the victim—who was bound to the bed and
gagged throughout—so that the victim bled to death on the defendant‘s own
mattress.154 The defendant engaged in this behavior in the course of twelve
days with no previous indication of sexually violent tendencies. 155 By
excising these facts from her decision, Justice O‘Connor removed the lower
courts‘ reasons for the finding that Washington was psychologically unstable,
the key to lower courts‘ rulings that his attorney‘s representation was
between them lies. Moreover, the judge cannot decide the facts before he
formulates for himself, if only at first glance, a view of the law, since the
number of facts is infinite and he must focus only on those that are relevant,
which is determined by the law. Yet the judge cannot determine the law before
he takes, again if only as a first impression, a stand regarding the facts, since the
number of laws is great and he must concentrate on the law that applies, which
is determined by the nature of the facts. There exists, then, an intimate link
between norm and fact.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. For a fuller explanation of judicial fact-finding by the Strickland Court, see Gregory J.
O‘Meara, S.J., The Name Is the Same, but the Facts Have Been Changed to Protect the Attorneys:
Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate Decision-Making, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 687 (2008).
149. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1266 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). David
Washington came from a ―broken and violent home, one marked by extensive child abuse and
incest.‖ Id.
150. See Washington v. Florida, 362 So. 2d 658, 660–61 (Fla. 1978), for an extended
description of the crimes David Washington committed in a twelve-day period.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 660.
154. Id. at 661.
155. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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constitutionally defective.
Without these facts found by lower courts, the reader of Strickland is not
particularly disturbed when she learns that, in preparation for sentencing, the
attorney spoke with the defendant but never met Washington‘s wife or
mother.156 He did not seek other character witnesses to bolster Washington‘s
case, nor did he request a psychiatric examination, ―since his conversations
with his client gave no indication that [Washington] had psychological
problems.‖157 Because of counsel‘s own sense of hopelessness about
overcoming the defendant‘s subsequent confession to additional crimes,
counsel decided not to put on further evidence about Washington‘s character
and emotional state at the capital sentencing hearing.158 Despite counsel‘s
lack of action, the Court held that David Washington received effective
assistance of counsel according to the dictates of the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.159
If the Strickland rule is unchanged, an honest reading of Strickland‘s facts
requires that an appellate court grant no relief when a defense attorney takes
the following combined actions before a capital sentencing hearing: (1) fails
to investigate a defendant‘s family history; (2) fails to talk with a defendant‘s
employers; (3) fails to consult a defendant‘s neighbors; (4) fails to request
psychological experts or read his client‘s psychological report filed with the
court; and (5) fails to request a presentence report. In some ways, it is
breathtaking how little counsel must do to comport with Sixth Amendment
standards. In part, the Court‘s willingness to bend over backwards and find
that David Washington‘s attorney provided constitutionally sufficient
representation may have confused lower courts‘ analyses of the issue.
D. The Court Retreats from Strickland? Indications that “Ineffective
Assistance” May Mean Something
While claiming adherence to the rule in Strickland—as all federal courts
must lest they announce ―new law‖ in habeas cases—the Supreme Court has
applied the rule in surprising ways, given the facts in the earlier case. 160 In
Williams v. Taylor,161 Wiggins v. Smith,162 and Rompilla v. Beard,163 the Court
156. Id. at 672–73.
157. Id. The lower court noted that the trial attorney did not recall even reading the courtordered psychological report filed in the case. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888–89
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
158. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
159. Id. at 698–99.
160. Initially, the Court applied Strickland quite narrowly. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776, 788–92 (1987).
161. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
162. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
163. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
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demanded that trial counsel engage in far more robust investigation than had
been required in Strickland. In Williams, the Court remanded for resentencing
because of counsel‘s inadequate preparation for the mitigation phase; the
Court ruled that undiscovered evidence of child abuse and borderline mental
retardation may have ―influenced the jury‘s appraisal of [the defendant‘s]
moral culpability.‖164 In Wiggins, counsel, who did a great deal of
investigation in the case, failed to pursue leads suggesting the defendant
suffered from a history of abuse and neglect that may have diminished his
moral culpability. 165 The Court held that counsel‘s representation of Wiggins
was therefore ineffective. 166 In Rompilla, although counsel was far more
diligent than the attorneys in either Williams or Wiggins, the Court found his
representation ineffective. 167 Rompilla‘s attorney spoke with five family
members and employed three mental health experts; further, the defendant
himself was decidedly unhelpful and sent the lawyer on false leads. 168
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the investigation inadequate and ruled
that counsel needed to investigate everything relevant to the penalty phase,
regardless of the accused‘s admissions or statements. 169 As discussed below,
federal circuit courts have proven willing to find ineffective assistance in
cases where the Strickland Court presumably would not.
VI. CIRCUIT COURTS APPLYING STRICKLAND AFTER AEDPA
As Professor Blume observes, few habeas petitioners are successful, 170
164. Williams, 529 U.S. at 398.
165. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–35.
166. Id. at 535.
167. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393.
168. Id. at 381–82.
169. Id. at 387. The recent case of Schriro v. Landrigan points to a sea change among even the
more conservative Justices on the Court. 550 U.S. 465 (2007). In Landrigan, a 5–4 majority found
that the reviewing district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a petitioner an
evidentiary hearing on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant had
instructed counsel not to put on a mitigation case at all in the penalty phase of his capital sentencing
trial. Id. at 481. In its discussion of the Ninth Circuit‘s decision, the majority signaled that it
recognizes the Strickland–AEDPA combination is not merely an impenetrable loop. Rather than
relying merely on Strickland, and applying AEDPA to uphold the district court‘s decision, Justice
Thomas found it necessary to underscore the novelty of the claim presented to the Court. ―Indeed,
we have never addressed a situation like this.‖ Id. at 478. Justice Thomas‘s decision focused on the
defendant‘s affirmative statements in open court directing counsel not to introduce mitigation
evidence. Id. at 478–80. Thomas had to tailor his holding this narrowly because the case is
otherwise indistinguishable from the ruling in Rompilla, where the defendant refused to assist in the
development of a mitigation case. Thomas‘s need to distinguish Rompilla (however weakly) to
garner the five votes necessary to constitute the majority indicates that at least one person in that bloc
recognizes that the law has changed significantly since Strickland‘s ―breathing standard‖ was
announced as the law of the land.
170. See Blume, supra note 11 at 284, and accompanying text. Professor Blume calculates that
0.62% of petitioners succeed. Id.
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and because so few writs are granted, there is no possibility of confirming a
correlation, much less a cause, between a defendant‘s advancing particular
sorts of arguments and the court‘s granting of the writ. Nevertheless, trends
emerge in which circuit courts either redefine or ignore the standards set out
in Strickland to grant habeas relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Not all circuit courts have announced a robust standard that imposes
higher standards on defense attorneys than did Strickland itself.171 Indeed,
circuit courts have not been internally consistent in granting writs or
remanding cases for evidentiary hearings. Still, as the cases below
demonstrate, the Strickland–AEDPA combination does not in itself prevent
petitioners from prevailing in federal court.
That said, surely some courts have acted as though a post-AEDPA
challenge on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot prevail. In
Ward v. Dretke, the Fifth Circuit seemed convinced its hands were tied by
AEDPA‘s restrictions.172 In Ward, Judge Higginbotham reviewed a district
court‘s finding of ineffective representation at sentencing based on trial
counsel‘s failure to object when the prosecutor quoted a Bible passage to
condemn the petitioner.173 The court agreed that the state postconviction court
unreasonably applied Strickland by not finding ineffective representation
where the defense attorney did not object to this argument. 174 The court
further ruled that such an objection was necessary to mitigate the ―highly
prejudicial effect‖ of the prosecutor‘s actions. 175 Nevertheless, the court
understood its duty as ―looking . . . through the prism of AEDPA deference,‖
which demanded that it not ―disturb the state habeas court‘s determination
that Ward was not prejudiced.‖176 Even though the court believed that the
state court‘s ruling was an objectively incorrect and ―unreasonable‖ statement
of the law, it also believed AEDPA‘s deference standard compelled it to
uphold the state court‘s finding on the merits.177 It appears the panel thought
171. In fact, circuit courts have consistently ruled against habeas petitioners claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Lynn v. Bliden, 443 F.3d 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2006);
Davis v. Greiner, 428 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2005); Allen v. Woodford, 366 F.3d 823, 828–29 (9th Cir.
2004); Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 2003); Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 205
(4th Cir. 2003); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003); Riley v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d
308, 311 (5th Cir. 2003).
172. Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2005).
173. Id. at 497.
174. Id. In closing, the prosecutor quoted, ―‗But whosoever shall offend one of these little ones
which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he
were drowned in the depth of the sea.‘‖ Id. at 496 (quoting Matthew 18:6 (New King James)). The
defendant had testified that he had turned to religion, and the prosecutor claimed his quotation
constituted an invited response. Id. at 497.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 500.
177. Id. at 499–500.
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AEDPA‘s restrictions could not be surmounted even when state courts
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.
Other courts have navigated ineffective assistance of counsel claims
without departing from the Strickland test and likewise upholding AEDPA‘s
deference requirements. Brown v. Sternes178 reversed a district court opinion
denying issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in a non-death penalty case where
the defendant had been sentenced to thirty years‘ incarceration for armed
robbery.179 The petitioner had previously been diagnosed with chronic
schizophrenia by two different psychiatrists.180 Brown‘s court-appointed
attorney failed to follow up on a subpoena for the petitioner‘s psychiatric
records and also failed to advise court-appointed doctors that her client had a
recent history of treatment for mental illness. 181 She further neglected to
inform stand-in counsel who tried the case for her that Brown had a history of
mental illness. 182 The Seventh Circuit panel found the trial attorney offered
no credible explanation for why she abandoned any attempt to investigate her
client‘s mental condition.183 Therefore, the court ruled her unexplained
failures were deficient representation, 184 and this deficiency prejudiced her
client.185 The court found that the state court‘s conclusions were unreasonable
based on the evidence in the case,186 and counsel‘s failure to act even when
the client‘s previous attorney told her of his mental illness required that the
court grant habeas relief.187
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit‘s Humphries v. Ozmint overturned the
district court‘s dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus where it found
that the court applied settled federal law unreasonably in failing to find
counsel‘s representation ineffective.188 In Humphries, the prosecutor‘s
closing argument during capital sentencing compared the respective worth of
the defendant‘s life with that of the murder victim. 189 This argument
conflicted with Supreme Court precedent that prohibited a use of victim
impact evidence ―that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

304 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 699.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 699.
366 F.3d 266, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 270–71.
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fundamentally unfair.‖190 The failure of Humphries‘s counsel to object to this
line of argument fell ―below an objective standard of reasonableness,‖ and
this failure prejudiced the defendant.191
Although each of these cases overturned district court findings denying
relief, Brown and Humphries rested squarely on the original holding of
Strickland and broke no new legal ground. Rather, the facts of these cases
permitted rulings that left Strickland‘s holding intact while paying heed to
AEDPA‘s deference standards. The circuit courts provided common-sense
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent and AEDPA.
Nevertheless, circuit courts have gone further than merely upholding
Strickland and deferring to AEDPA‘s provisions. For example, AEDPA
restricts granting evidentiary hearings to develop facts because state court
findings on the merits are presumed correct unless the petitioner refutes these
findings by clear and convincing evidence. 192 Circuit courts have ignored this
procedural hurdle and have remanded cases for hearings to determine the
substance of ineffectiveness claims without ruling on the statutory
presumption. 193 In Eze v. Senkowski, the Second Circuit vacated the denial of
a writ and remanded the case to the lower court to determine, inter alia, (1)
why counsel failed to introduce relevant medical examinations that undercut
the prosecution‘s chief witness, (2) why counsel did not call its own expert on
injuries that may have been evidence of sexual assault, and (3) why counsel
190. Id. at 272 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).
191. Id. at 276 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2006):
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in
State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
Id.
193. Although no court relies explicitly on the constitutional basis of habeas corpus for
ignoring the statute here, it may well be that courts are willing to sidestep niceties of procedure when
they see constitutional matters at issue. See supra Part IV.B.
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failed to produce exculpatory evidence that was clearly available to him. 194
Although the court noted that the ineffectiveness of counsel claims regarding
the expert witnesses were addressed on their merits by the district court,195 it
never averred to the presumption language in § 2254(e) of AEDPA.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of a writ and remanded to
supplement the record and determine if counsel‘s failure to investigate three
alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of
investigation.196 The court found that the district court followed AEDPA in
upholding the state court‘s finding that at least one alibi witness contacted the
attorney before trial, and the attorney did not know of any other alibi
witnesses before trial. 197 However, the circuit court ordered findings on why
counsel failed to investigate further after receiving a call from this alibi
witness.198 Apparently this issue was also raised in the state court, but the
district court did not address it. 199 The Sixth Circuit remanded and ordered a
hearing on these matters arguably addressed in the state court without ruling
on the § 2254(e) presumption.200 Both the Second and Sixth Circuits alluded
to insufficiencies in the record, but neither followed the dictates of the statute.
By remanding for hearings without finding the presumption was overcome,
the courts arguably violated the letter of the statute while upholding the spirit
of constitutional due process.
A broader ruling emerges in Dugas v. Coplan, where the First Circuit
vacated the district court‘s denial of a petition for a writ.201 The court found
that because counsel failed to consult an arson expert as part of his
investigation, his representation was ineffective and prejudiced the
defendant.202 The case was remanded to re-determine the question of
prejudice that was never addressed by the state court, which failed to find
deficient performance. 203 The state court found that counsel‘s performance
comported with Strickland and that he had properly weighed ―the benefits and
perils of hiring an [arson] expert.‖204 By contrast, the district court found

194. Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2003).
195. Id. at 120. The New York State Appellate Division ―did not discuss the merits of Eze‘s
ineffective assistance claim.‖ Id. at 119.
196. Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 576 (6th Cir. 2004).
197. Id. at 565.
198. Id. at 576.
199. Id. at 572. ―Even though Bigelow raised this issue below and in state court, the district
court did not address it . . . .‖ Id.
200. See id. at 576.
201. Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 342–43 (1st Cir. 2005).
202. Id. at 341.
203. Id. at 343.
204. Id. at 326.
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deficiency but no prejudice. 205 The circuit court demanded an evidentiary
hearing and found the state unreasonably applied Strickland.206 Again, there
was no invocation of § 2254(e)‘s presumption.
In addition to ignoring the presumptions required for ordering an
evidentiary hearing, the First Circuit expanded counsel‘s duties beyond
Strickland‘s requirements.207 The Dugas court found the defense attorney at
fault for failing to hire an arson expert and investigating the case fully because
the attorney evoked no ―reasonable professional judgments‖ that supported
limiting his investigation. 208 The defense‘s theory of the case did not question
if the fire at issue was arson; rather, his defense was an identity defense,
suggesting another perpetrator started the fire. 209 The majority maintained
that the attorney still needed to investigate the possibility that the fire was not
caused by arson because it would offer an alternative ground for reasonable
doubt.210 Essentially, the circuit court characterized Strickland as holding
counsel ineffective for inadequately preparing a different theory of the case
from the one counsel chose. 211 This seems a stark contrast to the facts in
Strickland, where counsel stopped preparation for capital sentencing because
he was overcome by a feeling of ―hopelessness,‖ and yet his representation
was sound under the Sixth Amendment.212 The facts in Dugas underscore
how circuit courts see the law of ineffective assistance of counsel as
demanding far more than was required in Justice O‘Connor‘s 1984 opinion.
In particular, circuit court decisions have regularly challenged insufficient
investigation by defense counsel, a factor the Strickland court deemed
essentially unproblematic. 213 In Frazier v. Huffman,214 the Sixth Circuit
quoted Strickland for the proposition that ―‗strategic choices made after less
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that

205. Id. at 327.
206. Id. at 334.
207. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has changed the law on ineffective assistance
of counsel in the cases following Strickland, see O‘Meara, supra note 148.
208. Dugas, 428 F.3d at 327.
209. Id. at 331.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 332.
212. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 718 (1984).
213. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. In Strickland, the Court held that the
same standards apply to counsel in both trial and capital sentencing hearings because the latter is
―sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision.‖
466 U.S. at 686–87. Strickland addressed counsel‘s acts and omissions at the sentencing phase; by
contrast, the failures to investigate addressed by the circuit courts here also involve trial matters. I
am not aware that courts have made a distinction between these two phases since Strickland, but this
difference may account for the differences in analysis.
214. 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003).
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reasonable professional judgments support the limitations.‘‖ 215 The court then
distinguished Strickland, finding that no ―reasonable attorney who saw the
medical records indicating Frazier‘s brain injury would have declined to
investigate the matter.‖216 The court also paid lip service to the lower court‘s
finding on the merits, but the circuit court held the lower court‘s ruling to be
an unreasonable conclusion based on the facts in the record. 217 In Bell v.
Miller, the Second Circuit granted a writ for ineffective assistance of counsel
because the defense attorney failed to call an expert on the possible effects of
trauma and drugs on an identifying witness, even though that witness testified
that he suffered from memory loss.218 The court held that counsel‘s failure to
investigate the scientific implications of a witness‘s trauma, blood loss, and
sedation ―handicapped his cross-examination of those key prosecution
witnesses.‖219 The court thus expanded the holding in Strickland by requiring
effective counsel to research cumulative background information because it
may assist in the cross-examination of a witness.220
Even the Fourth Circuit in Gray v. Branker221 reversed the judgment of
the district court to the extent that it denied the writ of habeas corpus to an
inmate claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of
his case.222 The circuit court found that the attorney failed to investigate and
develop, for sentencing purposes, evidence that the defendant suffered from
severe mental illness, and the court found it was reasonably probable that this
failure prejudiced the outcome at sentencing. 223 The court found ―Gray‘s
counsel were confronted repeatedly with indications of Gray‘s mental
impairment. . . .
[C]ounsel ignored these red flags and failed to
investigate.‖224 The court held that a new sentencing was required. 225
215. Id. at 794 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91).
216. Id. at 795.
At a bare minimum, a reasonable attorney would have compared the records
with the medical literature on brain damage, elicited information from Frazier
himself about the injury and its effects on him, or presented the records on
Frazier to someone who could competently evaluate them. To do none of these
things after seeing Frazier‘s medical records was unreasonable.
Id. Recall that Strickland‘s attorney could not recall if he read the competency report filed in that
case for his client, and Strickland‘s representation was found to be effective. Washin gton v.
Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 888–89 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). The difference between the results of the
two cases could not be more striking.
217. Frazier, 343 F.3d at 795–98.
218. 500 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2007).
219. Id. at 156.
220. See id. at 156–57.
221. 529 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2008).
222. Id. at 242.
223. Id. at 239–40.
224. Id. at 229.
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has granted petitions alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel where attorneys failed to investigate adequately.
Recently, in Adams v. Quarterman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court‘s grant of habeas relief where the inmate was prejudiced by trial
counsel‘s decision not to present mitigation evidence after making only
cursory contact with the defendant‘s family over the defendant‘s objection. 226
The court held that counsel‘s failure to interview or present any witnesses
during the punishment phase of petitioner‘s trial prevented the jury‘s learning
of ―substantial evidence that might have influenced the jury to determine that
mitigating factors required a sentence of life imprisonment rather than
death.‖227 Petitioner‘s half-siblings would have testified to the physical abuse
and deprivation Adams suffered as a child. 228 Further, affidavits from
psychologists indicated that the defendant suffered from ―bipolar disorder,
alcohol and drug dependence, and a personality disorder with borderline and
antisocial features.‖229 Even assuming that the inmate instructed counsel not
to contact his family, counsel had a duty to seek out other mitigation. 230 In the
absence of significant investigation into an inmate‘s background, there would
be no way for counsel to frame a strategy in the first place. 231
The Sixth Circuit‘s approach closely tracks the Fifth Circuit‘s approach.
In Jells v. Mitchell, petitioner‘s application for a writ of habeas corpus on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel was denied. 232 The court reversed
the denial and remanded because of trial counsel‘s deficient performance. 233

225. Id. at 240.
226. Adams v. Quarterman, 324 F. App‘x 340 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
227. Id. at 351, 356.
228. Id. at 351. ―Adams‘s foster mother, Linda Elliott, would have told the jury that when she
first encountered Adams in his family‘s mobile home, he was two years old, and neither he nor his
siblings had eaten in three or four days and did not know where their parents had gone.‖ Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 347. In reaching this decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly disavowed a broad reading
of Schriro v. Landrigan:
[T]he state‘s reliance on Schriro v. Landrigan is misplaced. There, the Supreme
Court stated that if a defendant issues an instruction to counsel not to present
any mitigating evidence, counsel‘s failure to investigate cannot constitute
[ineffective assistance of counsel]. In contrast, the Supreme Court noted that
Rompilla v. Beard presented a different situation, one in which ―the defendant
refused to assist in the development of a mitigation case, but did not inform the
court that he did not want mitigating evidence presented.‖ In the instant case,
there is no evidence that Adams instructed counsel not to present mitigating
evidence.
Id. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
231. Id. at 349.
232. 538 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir. 2008).
233. Id. at 494, 513.
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In particular, counsel failed to prepare adequately for the mitigation phase of
sentencing because he did not hire a mitigation specialist until the defendant
was already convicted in the guilt phase. 234 Second, he failed to provide to the
mitigation specialist the defendant‘s personal history records that were
required for the specialist to perform the requested psychological
evaluation.235 Counsel never attempted to speak with ―many other family
members who had lived with‖ the defendant and were available to testify. 236
Those few witnesses with whom counsel did speak were subject only to brief
inquiries, and counsel failed to discover the defendant‘s history of extensive
abuse in the home. 237 Much of this evidence was readily available to counsel
in the defendant‘s competency report, which counsel never consulted. 238 On
this final point, Justice O‘Connor‘s majority opinion in Strickland excised the
fact found by lower courts that David Washington‘s trial counsel could not
recall if he had ever read his client‘s competency report.239 By contrast, the
Sixth Circuit named that exact same failure by counsel as proof that his
representation was ineffective. 240 Clearly, the circuit courts have gone beyond
the Strickland rule.
Not all Strickland challenges to investigation and preparation focus on the
sentencing phase. Circuit courts have granted the writ for trial errors as well.
In Richards v. Quarterman, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court‘s
granting of the writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel where a state inmate was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for
murdering a homeless man.241 After ruling that the lower court offered proper
deference to the state habeas court‘s decisions and rulings in accord with
AEDPA,242 the district court found that counsel failed to present crucial
exculpatory evidence related to a later attack on the victim involving multiple
assailants other than the defendant, failed to interview three important
witnesses before trial, failed to have an organized plan of defense, and failed
to ―conduct Richards‘s defense in an acceptable manner.‖243 Moreover, the
district court made specific findings that it found the defendant‘s attorney to

234. Id. at 494.
235. Id. at 493.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d
879, 888–89 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
240. Jells, 538 F.3d at 493–94.
241. Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 558, 572 (5th Cir. 2009).
242. Id. at 563.
243. Id. at 561.
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be less than candid in replying to the court‘s inquiries.244 The federal court
found that the state courts unreasonably applied federal law. 245
Similarly, in Lindstadt v. Keane, another non-death penalty case,
petitioner was convicted of sexual assault of his daughter, and the district
court denied his application for a writ.246 After setting out the deferential
standards in AEDPA, the Second Circuit considered four errors by counsel in
the aggregate. 247 First, counsel ignored that the dates of the offense charged
were wrong because the defendant was not living in the family home at the
time the charged offenses took place, thereby preventing the defendant from
offering ―something akin to an alibi‖ defense. 248 Second, counsel failed to
object to the explanation for the victim‘s injuries. 249 The state‘s medical
expert relied on vaguely identified studies to claim that the girl‘s injuries were
caused solely by sexual contact.250 The defense never requested these studies,
and the prosecution was unable to produce them for postconviction
proceedings.251 By contrast, petitioner‘s appellate counsel was able to find a
number of contemporaneous studies that cast doubt on the linkage between
the victim‘s injuries and sexual abuse. 252 Third, in his opening statement,
counsel stated that his client would testify only if the prosecution had made its
case.253 Therefore, when the defendant did testify, counsel essentially
conceded that the prosecution had proved its case. 254 Finally, defense counsel
failed to make an obvious point that the defendant‘s wife wanted him jailed
and had complained to his probation officers on a number of prior
occasions. 255 The court held that, ―[t]aken together, ineffectiveness permeated

244. Id. at 566. The circuit court decision quotes the district court at some length concerning
the testimony of the petitioner‘s trial counsel, Davis:
―Apparently recognizing the significance of Davis‘s failure to present this
exculpatory evidence, or even to allow it to be presented when the prosecutor
attempted to do so, Davis strived at the July 21–22 hearing to create the
appearance of a strategic reason why she kept the exculpatory evidence from the
jury. In the process, Davis has engaged in what might best be described as legal
prestidigitation.‖
Id. (quoting Richards v. Quartermann, 578 F. Supp. 2d 849, 860 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).
245. Id. at 568.
246. Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2001).
247. Id. at 199–203.
248. Id. at 200.
249. Id. at 201.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 202.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 203.
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all the evidence.‖256 The court found that in the face of ―underwhelming
evidence,‖ counsel‘s deficiencies prejudiced his client. 257
The Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Moore v. Czerniak found trial error so
serious that it reversed and remanded a district court‘s denial of the writ. 258 In
Moore, defense counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his client‘s taped
confession.259 Counsel mistakenly believed that his client was not in custody
when he requested an attorney before interrogation. 260 Further, the fact that
the defendant made similar statements to third parties about the crime did not
render counsel‘s error harmless because suppressing the taped statement given
in violation of the Fourth Amendment would have placed the defendant in a
far better position to negotiate a plea bargain.261 Counsel‘s failure prejudiced
the defendant.262 The court found that counsel failed to object because he
misunderstood the law and for no strategic reason. 263 Rather than indulging
Strickland‘s presumption of effectiveness, the circuit courts seem willing to
recognize poor trial work and grant petitioners relief.
Two final decisions arising from the same state case demonstrate that
whatever else can be said about the application of Strickland after AEDPA,
the law continues to confuse the courts. Alexandre Mirzayance confessed to
the brutal murder of his cousin whom he stabbed nine times and shot four
times. 264 He pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 265 In
California, such a plea requires a bifurcated trial consisting of (1) a guilt phase
wherein the state bears the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
and (2) an insanity phase in which the defense will bear the burden of proving
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 266 Specifically, to establish the
defense under California law, the defendant needed to prove that he ―was
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his . . . act
and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the
offense.‖267 The same jury would hear the evidence in both trial phases of the
trial.268

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 205.
Moore v. Czerniak, 534 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1148–49.
Id. at 1130.
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1415 (2009).
Id.
Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1985).
See Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1416.
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Mirzayance‘s counsel tried to persuade a jury in the guilt phase that,
because of his client‘s mental illness, he was unable to kill with
premeditation.269 The jury rejected that argument and convicted him of firstdegree murder.270 The insanity phase was set to begin on the following day. 271
Counsel then advised Mirzayance to withdraw his not guilty by reason of
insanity plea (NGI), and the defendant did so. 272 After conviction,
Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney‘s
recommendation deprived him of his only viable defense. 273 The state
appellate court rejected this claim without giving a reason.274
In the ensuing habeas hearing, counsel testified that he recommended
withdrawal of the NGI plea ―out of a sense of hopelessness,‖ basing his
decision on two factors.275 Counsel explained that he did not believe that a
jury that found premeditation would find insanity, and he was angry because
the defendant‘s parents declined to testify at sentencing. 276 Specifically,
counsel testified that he was so angry at Mirzayance‘s parents that he was not
sure if ―[he] became so emotional that [he] lost [his] sense of advocacy.‖ 277
Further, counsel did not seem to clearly distinguish between the standards
required for premeditation and insanity and did not think a jury would find
premeditation and rule in favor of an insanity defense. 278 Finally, counsel
thought the judge was sympathetic to his client and ―would sentence him to a
psychiatric prison, but would sentence more harshly if the jury found him
sane.‖279 The Ninth Circuit found the attorney‘s ―advice to . . . withdraw the
insanity plea ‗fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,‘ and
therefore constitute[d] deficient performance.‖ 280 The court thought he made
his decision rashly and based on speculation. 281 Because a reasonable
probability existed that but for the attorney‘s advice, the result of the
proceeding would have been different, the court found prejudice and affirmed
the district court‘s grant of habeas relief, though on different grounds. 282
By contrast, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions
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to deny the petition.283 In reaching this decision, the Court for the first time
characterized the rule in Strickland as a ―general standard‖ that gives the state
court more latitude reasonably to determine if a defendant has failed to satisfy
that standard.284 Therefore, the federal courts are supposed to follow a
―doubly deferential‖ judicial review in determining whether state decisions
are not simply incorrect but ―unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.‖285 The Court then held that the state court‘s determination was not
unreasonable when it concluded that Mirzayance‘s attorney was not deficient
when he counseled his client to abandon his insanity plea in the brutal slaying
of his cousin.286 The Court said the defense stood almost no chance of
success, and the Court does not require defense counsel to pursue every claim
or defense, no matter how unrealistic. 287
The Court then, in dicta, reasoned that even if Mirzayance‘s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim were subject to a de novo review, it would still
fail. 288 The Court thought counsel made a strategic choice not to adopt a
losing strategy.289 Although the Court accused the circuit court of engaging in
fact-finding and overturning the lower court‘s factual findings without
mentioning the ―clearly erroneous‖ standard,290 the Court never quoted the
attorney‘s testimony that ―[he] became so emotional that [he] lost [his] sense
of advocacy.‖291 If two courts are this far apart on one factually
uncomplicated case, it is difficult to say precisely the state of settled federal
law on ineffective assistance of counsel after AEDPA.
VII. CONCLUSION
My title derives from a common enough experience for anyone who has
asked for directions in New England. After admitting that one is lost and
needs to find the way to a lane in Marblehead, one finds a local New England
guide. Invariably, the guide will pause, purse his lips, and then pronounce,
―You can‘t get there from here.‖ This could indicate any number of
possibilities. The hearer could conjure up ideas of a time and space rift that
separates his destination from him for all time. On a less metaphysical plane,
the answer could indicate that the guide feels inadequate to the task of laying
out with precision the intricate maneuvers that must be accomplished to travel
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two miles as the crow flies. Or it could mean that even if the guide could give
the directions with precision, his assessment of the hearer is unflattering at
best. In any of the above scenarios, the same conclusion follows: ―You can‘t
get there from here.‖
The common wisdom among many defense attorneys is that one cannot
prevail in a habeas claim after AEDPA. This Article has attempted to debunk
that idea in cases where the petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Circuit courts seem willing in some instances to rethink case law
and sidestep some of AEDPA‘s restrictions to review the merits of the cases
before them. Because the law in this area remains confusing, it seems that
courts are more likely to continue disagreement rather than converge on one
approach. In short, maybe you can get there from here.
On a broader level, it may be time to question whether AEDPA‘s
restrictions on habeas review serve the common good. Reducing access to
courts to increase efficiency and grant finality to lower court decisions is not a
sufficient reason for permitting those without resources to suffer the added
indignity of an ineffective attorney. How the judicial system treats those
accused of crimes, and those perhaps wrongfully convicted, says something
about those of us who work in that system. Are we satisfied that the lines
restricting access have been drawn in the right places?

